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Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, by Kamal-Deen Ali� 
Leiden, Neth�: Brill, 2015� 372 pages�  
In Maritime Security Cooperation in the 
Gulf of Guinea, the legal adviser to the 
Ghana Navy, Commander Dr� Kamal-
Deen Ali, argues that the world should 
pay attention to the maritime domain of 
West and Central Africa� The same argu-
ment can be made about his book, as 
Ali not only provides the most in-depth 
analysis of maritime security prospects 
and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea to 
date but offers conceptual frameworks 
for maritime security that are applicable 
around the world� Furthermore, the 
lessons that can be extracted from the 
Gulf of Guinea experience—both the 
problems of insecurity and the efforts 
to address them—can serve as help-
ful guidance for approaching similar 
challenges elsewhere� Notwithstand-
ing the relative absence of credible 
literature on maritime security in West 
and Central Africa, this book exhibits 
the rigor of first-rate legal scholarship 
combined with the intimate knowledge 
gleaned from an insider’s perspective, 
making it undoubtedly a seminal work 
on both the Gulf of Guinea specifically 
and maritime security in general�
Ali begins, rather helpfully, by exploring 
the meaning of several terms� First and 
foremost, he seeks to provide a work-
ing definition of the “Gulf of Guinea,” 
as the phrase has been used for years 
without any real consistency to describe 
the maritime region of West and Central 
Africa� Ultimately, the author expands 
the range of states included in this 
important region� At a minimum, Ali in-
cludes the twenty-five member states of 
the Maritime Organization of West and 
Central Africa, all of which are members 
of either the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) or the 
Economic Community of Central Afri-
can States (ECCAS)� But he notes  
that Rwanda, which recently rejoined 
ECCAS, should not be included, as its 
strategic interests do not align with the 
maritime domain of West and Central 
Africa� On the other hand, he argues that 
Mauritania, which left ECOWAS in 2000 
and is a member of the Arab Maghreb 
Union, should be included, as it is an 
important partner for maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea� This 
argument constitutes the first of many 
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novel contributions the book makes to 
the context-specific dynamics of mari-
time security in West and Central Africa�
Beyond defining the Gulf of Guinea, 
Ali makes a convincing case for the 
region’s global strategic significance� The 
economic contribution of the region to 
the global energy, mineral, and agricul-
ture markets makes the national security 
concerns of states in West and Central 
Africa concerns for the entire world� 
Even after the decline in the price of oil, 
Ali’s case remains unimpeachable, as his 
arguments for the region’s geostrategic 
relevance go far beyond oft-repeated 
statements about Nigerian oil in par-
ticular� With details about the region’s 
contribution to the global supply of 
cotton, cacao, and fish, one need never 
mention oil to recognize the economic 
significance of the Gulf of Guinea� 
These arguments lend further weight to 
the examples and analyses of the main 
portions of the book, but the concep-
tual features of the book are perhaps 
its most significant academic feature�
In reviewing the literature on maritime 
security, Ali exposes some significant 
gaps, in both coverage of issues and ex-
isting conceptual frameworks� He begins 
his analysis by asking a few important 
questions: What is security? What is 
maritime security? And for whom is 
maritime security? In dissecting some 
of the existing works on maritime 
security, he comes to advocate a “hu-
man security” approach, but compiles 
elements from a number of different 
sources� He thus settles on maritime 
security as being a composite of societal 
security, environmental security, food 
security, and economic security� One 
could argue, therefore, that this 
approach aligns maritime security more 
closely with development than defense�
Conceptually, Ali charts new territory 
on several fronts� First, his analysis 
of the theoretical underpinnings of 
security lead him to the conclusion that, 
although the literature is largely silent in 
doing so, the theoretical approaches to 
“security” in general can be applied to 
the maritime realm as well� He writes, “It 
is argued that since the ocean environ-
ment serves the political, economic, and 
strategic objectives of States, the dynam-
ics that surround the pursuit of all inter-
state interests will similarly be reflected 
in the maritime realm�” This notion of 
the activities, interests, and challenges of 
the maritime domain being interrelated 
with the broader national interests sug-
gests that a state’s maritime territory is a 
microcosm of the state itself� Thus mari-
time security cannot be severed from 
national interests—security, develop-
ment, governance, etc�—and is, indeed, 
a fundamental component of them�
Ali’s second departure from the lit-
erature involves taking an evolution-
ary approach to maritime security� By 
examining how maritime security has 
developed from being a matter merely 
of transportation security into a field 
posing integrated, multisectoral chal-
lenges today, he shows how the concept 
of maritime security has changed and 
broadened over time� Furthermore, he 
contends that states’ maritime concerns 
are context specific rather than uni-
versal� Partly for this reason, he also 
asserts that there is no real consensus 
on the elements of maritime security, 
allowing for a wide conception of what 
is included� He seems to suggest that 
the best approach in the literature is in 
the 2008 UN secretary-general’s Oceans 
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and the Law of the Sea report, which 
lists (section V[B]) the main maritime 
security threats as “piracy and armed 
robbery against ships”; “terrorist acts 
involving shipping, offshore installations 
and other maritime interests”; “[i]llicit 
trafficking in arms and weapons of mass 
destruction”; “illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances”; 
“[s]muggling and trafficking of per-
sons by sea”; “[i]llegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing”; and “intentional 
and unlawful damage to the marine 
environment�” He later assesses this 
set of threats, along with others, in the 
specific context of the Gulf of Guinea�
The third main departure is Ali’s novel 
framework for conceiving of maritime 
security� His framework, elaborated 
throughout the book, has three ele-
ments: (1) identifying the maritime 
security threat path; (2) applying the 
threat path to geopolitical and geostra-
tegic features; and (3) implementing a 
three-layer, three-indicator approach� 
The maritime security threat path is a 
bit more than merely a list of generic or 
even specific maritime security threats� 
It examines both the activity and the ef-
fects of any given threat� This approach 
allows for the contextualization of the 
threats versus geopolitical or strategic 
priorities� The third element of the 
framework then concerns the approach 
to those threats, involving three layers—
national capacity, regional cooperation, 
and global support—paired with three 
progress indicators—improved  
maritime governance, adequate legal 
frameworks, and an inclusive mari-
time security concept� While the book 
elaborates this conceptual approach in 
the Gulf of Guinea context, it is ap-
plicable globally� Further academic 
work is therefore warranted, applying 
Ali’s conceptual framework to other 
contexts besides the Gulf of Guinea�
As significant as this book’s theoreti-
cal contribution may be to the aca-
demic literature on maritime security in 
general, the book’s contribution to the 
discourse on maritime security in the 
Gulf of Guinea is impossible to express 
adequately� As a Ghanaian naval officer 
and legal adviser, Ali is able to delve 
into the subject matter in a way that 
few could� The majority of the book is 
dedicated to the region-specific analysis, 
and this is truly the heart of the work�
Given the resource constraints of West 
and Central Africa as well as the trans-
national nature of many of the threats, 
it is not surprising that cooperation 
is seen as the overarching answer to 
addressing maritime insecurity in the 
region� But the architecture of maritime 
security cooperation is still very much 
under construction� Ali meticulously 
dissects the challenges, internal and 
external, that plague the progress of 
effectively using cooperation as a means 
of countering threats� His personal 
familiarity with the processes afoot 
takes the chapters on both regional ap-
proaches and international partnerships 
beyond the capacity of normal academic 
scholarship� Indeed, one could not look 
up most of the information contained 
in these portions, further adding to 
the tremendous value of this volume�
Similarly, the legal analysis in this book 
would be difficult for any scholar outside 
the region to replicate� Ali’s access to 
national laws and regional legal frame-
works as well as his detailed understand-
ing of international maritime law affords 
him the opportunity to provide insight 
into both the legal developments and 
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challenges in the Gulf of Guinea� Indeed, 
the book may be viewed as a compen-
dium of the existing legal regimes in the 
Gulf of Guinea� This legal landscape is 
important to understand as efforts pro-
ceed to combat maritime insecurity and 
enhance maritime governance through 
cooperation� The section on emerging 
jurisdictional issues and legal com-
plexities is particularly significant, as it 
provides a helpful warning of problems 
that are likely to arise as the coopera-
tive architecture continues to develop�
Naturally, one of the challenges of writ-
ing an analysis of real-world issues is 
that they do not remain constant� If one 
were to attempt to identify a criticism 
of the book, it is that it is already out of 
date on a few specific issues, although 
one hardly can blame that on the author� 
For example, the section on private 
security companies or private maritime 
security companies, if written today, 
likely would include a number of new 
issues as well as new accountability 
mechanisms� But the analysis and les-
sons that can be gleaned remain sound 
and important, even if additional facts 
exist that could enhance the discussion�
 The book expressly arrives at five main 
conclusions: (1) Current processes for 
maritime security cooperation in the 
Gulf of Guinea do not address adequate-
ly the multiple security threats in the 
region� (2) Poor governance contributes 
significantly to maritime security threats 
in the Gulf of Guinea, but the current 
cooperative framework does not address 
the land-sea nexus of maritime security 
concerns� (3) The relevant legal frame-
work for maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea is poorly developed, and this un-
dermines the effectiveness of maritime 
security enforcement and regional and 
international cooperation� (4) Prevailing 
regional cooperative processes lack coor-
dination and have suffered several set-
backs� (5) International support for mar-
itime security cooperation in the Gulf 
of Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated, 
and in some cases driven by national in-
terests that affect its overall effectiveness�
These conclusions, as well as the analysis 
that led to them, serve as an invaluable 
aid in the ongoing effort to secure the 
maritime domain of West and Central 
Africa� This book is a must-read for 
maritime security scholars and anyone 
—from policy makers to industry 
leaders to students—working on mari-
time matters in the Gulf of Guinea�
IAN M� RALBY
Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the 
Making of On War, by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger� 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2015� 312 pages� $29�95�
One is tempted to ask why naval officers 
should be interested in reading a biog-
raphy of the wife of the famous Prussian 
philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz� 
In answer we might go to the words of 
Marie von Clausewitz herself, from her 
letter of dedication to Carl’s unfinished 
masterpiece On War: “Readers will be 
rightly surprised that a woman should 
dare to write a preface for such a work 
as this� My friends will need no explana-
tion� � � � Those who knew of our happy 
marriage and knew that we shared every-
thing, not only joy and pain but also 
every occupation, every concern of daily 
life, will realize that a task of this kind 
could not occupy my beloved husband 
without at the same time becoming 
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thoroughly familiar to me” (preface to 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed� and 
trans� Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
[Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ� Press, 
1986], p� 65 [emphasis in original])� 
In other words, to understand better 
On War’s hidden treasures, it helps 
to understand the formidable woman 
behind On War� We historians have 
this quaint notion that understanding 
the context for things helps one bet-
ter understand the things themselves� 
For naval professionals, especially at 
the Naval War College, which owes 
so much to the Prusso-German intel-
lectual tradition, to understand better 
the genesis of the greatest philosophy of 
war is no small thing� (Readers inter-
ested in evidence for this idea should 
consult Ronald H� Spector, Professors 
of War: The Naval War College and the 
Development of the Naval Profession 
[Honolulu, HI: Univ� Press of the Pacific, 
2005; originally published by the Naval 
War College Press, 1977], pp� 14–17)�
Additionally, Bellinger’s biography is 
the result of a fruitful collaboration 
with Donald Stoker, who has published 
a companion biography of Marie’s 
more-famous husband� Together they 
mined a treasure trove of recently 
uncovered correspondence between 
Carl and Marie held in Germany by the 
(now) famous couple’s descendants�
Marie von Clausewitz is more than just 
a biography of a woman married to an 
officer and military theorist; it covers the 
spectrum of relevant social, intellectual, 
military, political, and feminist history� 
It is truly a synthesis of all these forms, 
much like Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and 
the State (1976), which has held the field 
on the details of Clausewitz’s life and 
times until now� As advertised, though, 
the book is centered on the life of his 
companion and lifelong love, Countess 
Marie von Brühl� With her formidable 
language skills, Bellinger does exception-
al work in bringing the history, and even 
the prehistory, of the Brühl family to life�
Many surprises await the reader regard-
ing Marie’s background and influence� 
For example, she was no “ordinary” 
Prussian countess, but rather a daugh-
ter of an imperial count of the Holy 
Roman Empire� As an imperial aris-
tocrat, she frequented only the very 
highest social circles in Europe� Her 
friends and acquaintances were queens, 
princesses, and various types of grand 
duchesses—all themselves politically 
influential women, in an age when few 
women wielded such influence�
Marie’s elevated background raises 
the book’s first major question, which 
Bellinger poses in this way (p� 47): “How 
and why did a countess raised in the 
highest social circles ever allow herself 
to consider marrying a man with con-
spicuously less social standing?” Carl’s 
family had only a dubious claim to the 
“von”—which denoted nobility—in front 
of his name, he being a son of (at best) a 
very minor provincial official� Bellinger 
answers the question in this way (p� 8),  
and it tells one much about both Carl 
and Marie: “Indeed, from the very 
beginning of their romance, the couple 
determinedly defied the parochial at-
titudes of the time and strived to build a 
relationship if not equal in status, then 
at least equal in nature� � � � [I]t was Carl’s 
promise to treat her as an independent 
and free individual that made this for-
midable countess decide upon marriage 
with a man of lesser social standing�”
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In other words, Carl and Marie man-
aged to rise above the social norms of 
their times� Until now we have had only 
Carl’s perspective, as it were—the one 
we read in On War� By telling the story 
of the collaboration between the two, 
Bellinger’s book makes clear that the real 
political animal in the family was Marie, 
not Carl� Her influence can be judged by 
the fact that after Carl resigned his com-
mission in the Prussian army and left 
for Russia to join its army—without the 
Prussian king’s written permission—the 
king still acknowledged Marie, and even 
nodded to her at court functions� As for 
Carl, the king never forgave him com-
pletely; he did allow him to rejoin the 
Prussian army later, but never gave him 
a position of real influence� Again, this 
misfortune is our good fortune, since 
it probably allowed Carl the extra time, 
beyond that required for his minimal 
duties at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, 
to write and rewrite his masterpiece�
One also learns that Marie was very ac-
tive in supporting her husband’s career, 
and developed friendships and corre-
sponded independently of Carl with the 
great figures of the day, especially Gen-
eral August Neithardt von Gneisenau� 
Marie’s mother, interestingly, was from 
the British middle class (a story in itself), 
and she taught Marie to speak English 
exceptionally well for a German aristo-
crat� This probably further cemented her 
relationship with Gneisenau, who also 
spoke English fluently� The two were 
so close that Marie, an accomplished 
painter, later executed one of the more 
famous existing portraits of Gneisenau�
Bellinger herself is married to a military 
service member� Because of that experi-
ence, as she writes about this military 
marriage she has an exceptional eye for 
the sorts of details that some academics 
might miss� Her text is full of interest-
ing insights and observations on the 
extraordinary couple, but also includes 
details that even sailors will recognize, 
such as the fact that Marie and Carl 
numbered all their letters when he was 
in the field so they could tell if some 
were missing� (The reviewer used this 
very technique with his spouse during 
his many cruises in the U�S� Navy�)
Readers looking for new insights on 
the Prussian perspective from inside 
the Prussian court during the Napole-
onic Wars will be well rewarded, as will 
those interested in how little or how 
much Marie played a role in the genesis 
and writing of On War, the subject that 
occupies roughly the last quarter of the 
book� Addressing Marie’s pivotal role in 
getting Carl’s work published, Bellinger 
leaves little doubt that without Marie 
there might have been no On War for 
us to read today, nor any of Carl’s other 
works� Ms� Bellinger’s work reminds 
us that a human life is rarely a solo ac-
complishment, lived apart and distinct 
from other human beings� Rather, a 
relationship such as that of Marie and 
Carl von Clausewitz is an enterprise 
lived in collaboration with others of our 
kind—or in Marie’s case, not her kind—
especially those we love and who love us� 
Highly recommended for all audiences�
JOHN T� KUEHN
A Higher Standard: Leadership Strategies from 
America’s First Female Four-Star General, by Ann 
Dunwoody� Boston: Da Capo, 2015� 288 pages� 
$25�99 (Kindle $14�99)�
In this book, General Ann Dunwoody, 
USA (Ret�), traces her illustrious career 
from initial entry into the Women’s 
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Army Corps in 1975 as a second lieuten-
ant through her promotion to four-star 
general to her retirement in 2012 as 
the commander of the Army Materiel 
Command (AMC)� Dunwoody came 
from an army family: her father was 
a veteran of both Korea and Vietnam 
and retired as a brigadier general; her 
brother was a West Point graduate; and a 
sister was one of the Army’s first female 
helicopter pilots� Throughout her re-
markable career, Ann Dunwoody blazed 
a trail with a lengthy list of “firsts”:
• First female field-grade officer in the
82nd Airborne Division
• First female to command a battalion
in the 82nd Airborne Division
• First female to command the Com-
bined Arms Support Command
• First female in the U�S� military to
achieve the rank of four-star general
Dunwoody’s promotion to four-star 
general made front-page news across the 
country and brought instant recognition 
outside military circles� Yet Dunwoody 
remained well-grounded, with strong 
support from her family� She relates sto-
ries about her mother and father and the 
influence each played in her career� She 
also tells about her husband, Craig, and 
how important he was to her success� 
These stories really enable the reader to 
relate to her on a personal level� Dun-
woody writes (p� 72): “Throughout my 
life I’ve met plenty of superheroes, but 
the strongest and most effective among 
them were the ones who were simply 
human and knew they weren’t perfect�”
The title of the book, A Higher Standard, 
is important to Dunwoody� “Those 
words became the foundation of my 
leadership philosophy and a central part 
of how I tried to live my life�” Dunwoody 
explains that she consistently worked 
hard to maintain a higher standard for 
both herself and whatever organization 
she led� After speaking to executives at 
Coca-Cola, Dunwoody related, “After 
managing nearly sixty-nine thousand 
employees, one thing is clear to me: 
there is a higher standard that pro-
vides the foundation upon which every 
effective leadership journey is built�” 
We all could learn from her mantra�
This is truly a book about leadership, 
with each chapter showcasing impor-
tant lessons and strategies applicable to 
leaders in any organization� Dunwoody 
highlights that “[t]his is not a manual 
about how to become a general, nor will 
I reveal a secret recipe for becoming a 
great leader�” Her sincerity and passion 
for the Army team are evident� Chapter 
2, “Wendell Would Be Proud—‘Never 
Walk by a Mistake’”—chronicles her 
relationship, as a new second lieuten-
ant platoon leader, with her platoon 
sergeant, Sergeant First Class Wendell 
Bowen� Dunwoody writes (p� 38): “Ser-
geant Bowen shared wisdom on many 
levels that guided me through every step 
of my military career�” In this chapter, 
she discusses the important leadership 
lessons that young officers and new 
leaders in any company must learn� 
Dunwoody is a good storyteller, and the 
lessons she shares are easy for the reader 
to relate to� The leadership lessons are 
summarized in the postscript: “Leader-
ship Strategies from an Army Life�”
Another chapter, “Leader of Leaders—
‘Build Your Bench,’” enables Dunwoody 
to chronicle her work to promote and 
build the succession plan at AMC 
prior to her retirement� She relates 
(p� 223): “One of the most important 
jobs a senior leader has is to develop 
leaders or to ‘build the bench�’” This 
is a critical lesson that many leaders 
never learn—to the detriment of the 
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organizations they lead� Countless lead-
ers are often too involved in promot-
ing themselves, and see developing 
subordinates as a sign of weakness�
The final chapter, “Afterthoughts—
‘My Way to Continue the Conversa-
tion � � � ,’” was initially confusing� It 
did not flow with the rest of the book; 
it seemed disjointed; it seemed to be 
made up of random thoughts about a 
variety of topics� I eventually realized 
that it was Dunwoody’s way of discuss-
ing and underscoring contemporary 
issues she believes are important�
During my almost thirty-year career in 
the U�S� Army, I was privileged to serve 
in the 10th Mountain Division with Ann 
Dunwoody� Her technical and tactical 
skills, along with her keen insight and 
caring attitude, made her a positive role 
model� It is fitting that she ends every 
talk with the phrase “In the end, we’re all 
just soldiers, but that’s the highest thing 
you could claim to be�” Dunwoody’s leg-
acy in the Army and the larger U�S� mili-
tary will impact generations of young 
Americans for years to come� This book 
showcases her exceptional talents as an 
army officer and leader� It is a must-
read for leaders at all levels, in both 
the military and other organizations�
THOMAS J� GIBBONS
Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War, by Orde F� 
Kittrie� New York: Oxford Univ� Press, 2016� 504 
pages� $29�95 (Kindle $14�41)�
In Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War, 
legal scholar Orde F� Kittrie analyzes the 
increasing effectiveness of the use of law 
to achieve objectives that not long ago 
might have been achievable only using 
force� In one of the first major works 
in English on the practice of lawfare, 
Kittrie has written an important book 
for lawyers, policy makers, and military 
strategists� Successful strategic perfor-
mance requires an appreciation of the 
role of politics in war, and because law 
is an intensely political matter it is an 
integral part of the strategic operating 
environment� Kittrie’s highly readable 
Lawfare enhances our understanding of 
the growing strategic potential of law�
This book is at once a history of lawfare, 
a collection of representative case stud-
ies, and a resource for other researchers� 
The foreword by former CIA director R� 
James Woolsey Jr� is itself an interesting 
read, setting up Kittrie’s analysis with a 
description of the international legal are-
na as a sheriff-less “Wild West” exploited 
by various governments and nonstate 
actors� The author also describes his 
own foray into lawfare as a professor 
at Arizona State University, where his 
analysis of Iran’s dependence on external 
gasoline suppliers eventually led to the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Account-
ability and Divestment Act of 2010� Kit-
trie’s practical bent is evident through-
out Lawfare, and he offers numerous 
suggestions for incorporating lawfare 
into U�S� national security strategy�
Among the strengths of Lawfare are the 
concepts provided in the first chapter 
that prepare the reader for the case 
studies that follow� Kittrie begins with 
a historical overview, tracing lawfare 
back to the seventeenth century, when 
Hugo Grotius used legal arguments to 
bolster Dutch maritime power� Kit-
trie’s section on the literature of lawfare 
provides a unique summary of the 
leading works in the field� Kittrie breaks 
down the practice of lawfare into two 
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categories: instrumental lawfare—the 
use of legal methods to achieve results 
typically sought from kinetic weapons; 
and compliance leverage disparity—the 
seeking of advantages over an opponent 
more disposed to comply with the law� 
Kittrie attributes the rise of lawfare to 
three factors: the increased number and 
reach of international laws and tribunals, 
the rise of nongovernmental organi-
zations focused on the law of armed 
conflict, and the advance of globaliza-
tion and economic interdependence�
Kittrie follows up his macro-level 
conceptual analysis with detailed case 
studies at the micro level that exemplify 
the prevalent trends in lawfare� His 
examples move from the battlefields of 
the Middle East through the courtrooms 
of New York to the doctrinal manuals of 
the Chinese military� The range of ex-
amples, all linked by the common theme 
of lawfare’s increasing effectiveness, 
underscores how widespread and mul-
tifaceted the phenomenon has become�
Kittrie devotes four of his eight chapters 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which 
he describes (p� 197) as “the closest thing 
the world has to a lawfare laboratory�” 
For example, Israel’s experience with 
maritime law in 2011 demonstrates how 
“offensive” lawfare can achieve a military 
objective without using force� In May 
2010, Israeli forces intercepted a flotilla 
of ships from Turkey attempting to vio-
late a blockade of the Hamas-controlled  
Gaza Strip, killing nine people� A UN 
fact-finding mission subsequently 
criticized Israel for its handling of the 
incident� Faced with a similar flotilla 
preparing to leave Greece in June 2011, 
Israeli lawyers used legal measures to 
stop the ships from leaving port� Those 
measures included threatening legal 
action against companies providing 
the ships with essential services such as 
maritime insurance� In letters to these 
companies, Israeli lawyers referenced 
the U�S� Supreme Court case of Holder 
v. Humanitarian Law Project (561 U�S�
1 [2010], 130 S�Ct� 2705) to argue that
providing services to the flotilla was il-
legal because it supported terrorism� The
letters proved persuasive� By rendering
the ships unable to secure the necessary
services to gain permission to leave their
Greek ports, Israel succeeded in stopping
the 2011 flotilla without firing a shot�
Kittrie devotes a chapter to China’s inno-
vative approach to lawfare� He explains 
how China systematically wages lawfare 
across the strategic operating environ-
ment, including maritime, aviation, 
and space lawfare, as well as lawfare 
in cyberspace� For example, Kittrie 
analyzes how China is using maritime 
law to justify denying access to the South 
China Sea for international navigation� 
China has developed a concept of law-
fare it calls falu zhan, or “legal warfare,” 
as part of its military doctrine� Kittrie’s 
case studies show how China incorpo-
rates lawfare into its strategy through a 
comprehensive approach coordinated 
across the Chinese government�
Unlike China, the United States has no 
similar comprehensive lawfare strat-
egy� Kittrie describes how parts of the 
U�S� government nevertheless have 
employed legal techniques success-
fully to achieve strategic results, such as 
the U�S� Treasury’s use of international 
financial laws against Iran� Some of the 
most effective U�S� lawfare has been the 
work of private-sector attorneys rather 
than U�S� government actions� Kittrie 
provides several examples of litiga-
tion that used the Antiterrorism Act 
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of 1990� A significant case was Boim 
v. Holy Land Foundation, in which at-
torneys working on behalf of the family
of a U�S� victim of terrorism secured a
judgment against Islamic fund-raising
organizations, drying up a significant
source of material support to Hamas�
Kittrie concludes with a compelling 
argument for a more creative and in-
novative integration of lawfare into 
U�S� strategy� As he observes (p� 96), 
the 2015 National Security Strategy 
identifies security challenges that are 
decentralized, transcend state borders, 
involve nonstate actors, and “cannot 
be neutralized using only deterrence 
or the United States’ traditional ki-
netic toolbox�” Lawfare underscores 
why strategists must have a practical 
understanding of the entire spectrum of 
factors affecting the strategic operating 
environment—informational, cultural, 
political, economic, social, and legal�
Kittrie understands that it is unrealistic 
to expect strategists and policy makers 
to be legal experts as well, so his conclu-
sions include an analysis of the sources 
of “lawfare power” and recommenda-
tions for leveraging the skills of the U�S� 
legal community� To show how private-
sector expertise can inform potential 
military uses of lawfare, Kittrie describes 
how Special Operations Command 
Pacific reached out to the University of 
Pennsylvania’s law school for research on 
foreign criminal laws that could be used 
to detain and prosecute foreign fighters 
supporting the Islamic State� In Kittrie’s 
assessment (p� 32), if the United States 
properly leverages its extensive legal 
expertise to support a national lawfare 
strategy, the “U�S� advantage in sophis-
ticated legal weapons has the potential 
to be even greater than its advantage 
in sophisticated lethal weapons�”
Lawfare reminds us that lethal force 
is only one of many factors affecting 
outcomes in war� Kittrie points the way 
toward how legal factors can be used to 
achieve practical effects� Military officers 
and policy makers who read this book 
will be rewarded with a better under-
standing of the legal dynamics that are 
exerting an increasingly powerful influ-
ence on the legitimate use of violence�
KEVIN ROUSSEAU
Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Prepara-
tions for World War II, by John M� Lillard� Lin-
coln: Potomac Books, Univ� of Nebraska Press, 
2016� 224 pages� $39�95 (Kindle $26�37)�
With the Navy’s recent efforts to rein-
vigorate war gaming, there has been 
renewed interest in the interwar gaming 
conducted at the Naval War College in 
Newport, Rhode Island� In the Naval 
War College Review, Proceedings, and 
other maritime journals, war-gaming 
experts and enthusiasts alike have tried 
to characterize the nature and value of 
the Navy’s war games played between 
1919 and 1941� John Lillard’s Playing 
War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Prepa-
rations for World War II is the latest 
contribution to this resurgence� Seek-
ing to provide a comprehensive study 
of the interwar games conducted at the 
College, Lillard intends to inform our 
understanding of the “navy’s transition” 
during this period� Playing War asserts 
(p� 8) that the Newport games were 
“transformational” and played a “central 
role � � � in preparing the navy for war�” 
For the most part, the author contributes 
to the history of that era, but does so 
with a work that would have benefited  
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from additional editing and more at-
tention to detail in its historiography�
This book succeeds with its analysis of 
how the Newport war games evolved to 
reflect the emergence of new technolo-
gies and operational thinking for the 
Navy� Lillard organizes his analysis into 
three phases: early (1919–27); middle 
(1928–34); and late (1935–41)� He 
focuses on one or two College classes 
within each of the phases, concentrating 
on those of significant figures such as 
Chester Nimitz, Thomas Hart, Harold 
Stark, Kelly Turner, Bull Halsey, and 
Robert Ghormley� The author is at 
his best when he analyzes the actual 
games played and describes the relevant 
insights recorded by the student-players 
or the gaming faculty, or both� For ex-
ample, his section on Tactical Game 94 
of 1923 describes how that game demon-
strated the importance of reconnaissance 
and detection of the enemy’s forces first� 
In his chapter on the middle phase, Lil-
lard explains how the games explored 
the innovations of air and undersea 
warfare, pointing out that the players 
learned more about aviation than they 
did submarines� Lillard concedes that 
the College games were not innovative 
in themselves; instead he reinforces the 
idea that “they were a common playing 
field, a shared experience” for the men 
who would fight the next war at sea�
Playing War is a useful complement to 
Edward Miller’s War Plan Orange: The 
U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1991) and Albert Nofi’s To Train the 
Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Prob-
lems, 1923–1940 (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College Press, 2010)� Lillard’s ex-
amination of the 1933 Van Auken report 
is particularly effective at showing the 
College’s contributions to the evolution 
of War Plan ORANGE and the fleet prob-
lems� Requested by College President 
Admiral Harris Laning and written by 
Captain Wilbur R� Van Auken, head 
of the newly created Research Depart-
ment, the report summarized lessons 
learned from all the Blue-Orange games 
played between 1927 and 1933� The 
author notes that Van Auken’s analysis 
of the Trans Pacific problem presaged 
the logistic challenges of the war and 
the advent of the four hundred de-
stroyer escorts that emerged during the 
war� As War Plan ORANGE matured in 
the 1930s, so too did the war gaming, 
marked by the construction of Pringle 
Hall and its famously square-tiled gam-
ing floor� Lillard succinctly chronicles 
Newport’s war-gaming transforma-
tion throughout the book’s narrative�
Readers familiar with the scholarship 
that examines the U�S� Navy between 
the two world wars will be distracted 
by Lillard’s efforts to set his thesis apart 
from the other literature� Playing War 
looks and feels most similar to Michael 
Vlahos’s The Blue Sword: The Naval 
War College and the American Mis-
sion, 1919–1941 (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College Press, 1980)� Both of these 
works are short in length, and have 
appendices and tables that lay out the 
war games played by each class� Lillard’s 
book focuses more directly on the games 
and the chronology of the College than 
Vlahos’s monograph does� However, in 
attempting to separate his research from 
The Blue Sword, Lillard states (p� 10) that 
Vlahos “did not use wargame records 
from the Naval War College archives,” 
which is not true� Making matters more 
confusing, Lillard continues to refer 
to Vlahos’s text throughout the book� 
Later, Lillard asserts (p� 12) that John 
Hattendorf, coauthor of Sailors and 
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Scholars: The Centennial History of the 
U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 1984), is “a 
former professor of naval history” whose 
history of the College lacks “critical 
analysis�” At the time of publication, 
Hattendorf was and remains the Ernest 
J� King Professor of Maritime History
at the Naval War College, and is still
recognized as the preeminent scholar on
the history of the U�S� Navy at Newport�
In addition to these two notable errors, 
Playing War still reads like a disserta-
tion in need of another round of editing� 
Chapter introductions and descriptions 
of the students are repeated several times 
and add little to the analysis presented� 
With the main body of the book ending 
at 137 pages, this work leaves the reader 
with the impression that there is still 
more to explore about the relationship 
between the interwar war games and 
how the U�S� Navy fought during the 
Second World War� While this imperfect 
volume has some merit, the definitive 
history of the Naval War College’s inter-
war war games remains to be written�
JON SCOTT LOGEL
Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain 
System in Iraq and Afghanistan, ed� Montgomery 
McFate and Janice H� Laurence� New York: Ox-
ford Univ� Press, 2015� 320 pages� $39�95 (Kindle 
$22�99)�
The twenty-first-century security 
environment has been characterized by 
numerous cross-cultural battle spaces, 
such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan� 
The U�S� Army initiated the human 
terrain team (HTT) because it needed 
to address the impact of the human 
cultural dimension in the combat 
operational environment� The HTT’s 
mission was to conduct research (in the 
social sciences and anthropology) and 
to advise military commanders about 
the unique cultural aspects of the local/
regional population� In eleven chapters, 
McFate and Laurence have compiled 
an invaluable collection of experiences 
from the scientists involved� They afford 
us the opportunity to accompany these 
scientists on their journeys, as they share 
their perspectives with the military� We 
learn the value of embedding social 
scientists with military units and how 
important their knowledge and expertise 
are for military leaders to achieve an un-
derstanding of today’s complex, cultur-
ally diverse operational environments� 
In this way, social scientists can help 
military leaders make more-informed,  
and therefore better, decisions�
General David Petraeus (Ret�) states 
in the foreword that the “key ter-
rain in irregular warfare is the human 
terrain�” He highlights the role social 
scientists played in shaping the cultural 
framework of the battle space and how 
they contributed to military leaders’ 
knowledge to ensure mission success� 
General Petraeus posits the notion that 
the military indeed may require even 
greater sociocultural knowledge to 
conduct future military operations�
Today’s military leaders are well trained 
in tactics, techniques, and procedures; 
however, the twenty-first-century 
battle space presents inherent dif-
ficulties for military leaders� One of 
their principal deficiencies is a lack of 
cross-cultural competence (C3)� C3 is 
the ability to communicate effectively 
and appropriately with people of other 
cultures� As the number of multina-
tional coalition military operations 
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continues to increase, military leaders 
will need to achieve C3 to be effective�
Military leaders must be prepared to 
adapt to a wide range of cultural, social, 
and political challenges in the operation-
al environment� Education in cultural 
competency, cultural intelligence, and 
social intelligence plays a pivotal role in 
a military leader’s ability to lead, build 
relationships based on trust, and develop 
unity of effort and command within 
complex, culturally diverse environ-
ments� A leader’s ability to engage and 
communicate effectively requires that he 
or she understand the unique social and 
behavioral qualities of the local popula-
tion� This capability is a requirement 
for successful negotiation and conflict 
management� Lack of it can mean the 
difference between success and failure�
This volume is a tribute to the knowl-
edge and expertise of social scientists 
who served as members of HTTs� Their 
stories serve as evidence of their unique 
experiences, insights, and contributions 
toward achieving cultural understand-
ing in combat zones in places such as 
Iraq and Afghanistan� It is worth not-
ing that HTTs offered more than just 
cultural expertise� Rather, they made 
a considerable investment in develop-
ing relationships with local people 
and provided their military units with 
critical assessments about operating in 
and among members’ host nations� This 
information was critical for military 
decision makers and those involved in 
counterinsurgency campaigns, so it was 
critical for the social scientists as soon 
as possible to build rapport and cred-
ibility with the local population, as well 
as with the military units to which they 
were assigned� Laurence and McFate 
invite us to share their experiences as 
we join each scientist on that journey�
For example, James Dorough-Lewis’s 
chapter, “Investing in Uncertainty,” 
provides a clear illustration of some of 
the challenges the social scientists faced 
in the HTTs� We learn about the need to 
delineate between social scientists and 
members of the Intelligence Commu-
nity� This distinction is critical for social 
scientists as they attempt to establish 
relationships based on trust and cred-
ibility� Their research task is to assess 
and understand the cultural nuances 
and the cultural environment that may 
impact the overall military operation; 
in contrast, the intelligence analyst 
probes the environment for meaningful 
information that will be used to un-
derstand the operational environment� 
The social scientist seeks to understand 
each individual’s cultural perspective 
and relationships among people living 
in the environment� Social scientists and 
anthropologists in the HTTs work with 
the local people to build relationships 
based on trust and to find ways to help 
local people continue with their daily 
lives� In one such example (p� 196), the 
Army had built a hospital to meet all the 
security requirements� However, Sunni 
women needing medical care preferred 
to travel to a hospital an hour away—
rather than travel the path on which 
their husbands, sons, and brothers had 
lost their lives� Social scientists were 
able to communicate with these women 
and understand their cultural perspec-
tive, which they shared with the military 
team� This incident highlights the need 
to understand the culture, beliefs, and 
values of the local people when operat-
ing in a culturally diverse region� Social 
scientists provide a cultural lens toward 
the local people, examining and explain-
ing how they perceive what is happening 
in their unique cultural point of view�
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This book provides the perspectives 
and experiences of social scientists who, 
embedded with military teams, shared 
their knowledge and cultural expertise 
to help military leaders make informed 
decisions within culturally diverse 
environments� This volume will prove 
to be an invaluable resource for military 
leaders, as it highlights the importance 
and impact of understanding the role 
of cultural diversity in military op-
erations� McFate and Laurence have 
performed a service to the military by 
providing a valuable resource for all 
military leaders to guide them in future 
military operations� In addition, this 
book applauds those scientists who were 
daring enough to join in the human 
terrain effort and share their experiences 
with us� The ability to achieve cultural 
competence must be viewed as a war-
fighting imperative and as a prerequi-
site for all future military leaders� This 
volume is informative and inspiring—a 
must-read for all those interested in 
the cultural and human dimensions 
of multinational warfare� The detailed 
bibliography provides recommenda-
tions for further reading to enhance 
the reader’s knowledge of this topic�
YVONNE R� MASAKOWSKI
Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special 
Operations Command, by Sean Naylor� New York: 
St� Martin’s, 2015� 560 pages� $29�99 (paperback 
$17�99, Kindle $14�99)�
Once again, Sean Naylor has produced 
an authoritative and well-written book� 
Relentless Strike chronicles the history 
of the Joint Special Operations Com-
mand (JSOC), America’s top-tier special 
operations military unit� To the benefit 
of history and the reader, and most likely 
to the consternation of the Pentagon, 
Naylor’s knowledge of special operations 
and his extensive contacts reveal the 
temperaments and competencies of key 
individuals and the details of numerous 
clandestine missions and organizational 
capabilities� Many will condemn Naylor 
for revealing these secrets, but the 
fault is not with Naylor; it is with those 
who talked� The book also, perhaps 
unintentionally, exposes flaws in how 
the United States wages war, as well as 
the limitations of special operations�
The book begins by recounting the 
creation of JSOC after the failed Iranian 
hostage rescue operation in 1980� New 
threats to national security required a 
new military organization that had the 
resources and capabilities to respond 
quickly to crises and apply special-
ized military capabilities to rescue 
hostages, kill terrorists, and neutralize 
weapons of mass destruction� Naylor 
reminds us that senior military lead-
ers opposed the new command, but 
the failure in Iran trumped parochial 
thinking� The second and more inter-
esting part of the book addresses the 
expansion of JSOC as one result of the 
momentous impact of the 9/11 attacks�
From the beginning, JSOC had signifi-
cant advantages over both conventional 
military organizations and nonaffili-
ated special operations units� The units 
placed under JSOC’s direct control were 
the best-trained and best-resourced 
units in the military� Each of these 
units had its own sophisticated—and 
grueling—selection process� Remark-
ably, JSOC headquarters had nothing 
that mirrored such careful processes 
for selecting its staff� Also oddly, the 
Pentagon had no process for selecting 
a JSOC commander whose experience 
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and temperament matched the require-
ments of a national force� To be sure, 
some of JSOC’s early commanders were 
excellent—but that was the exception� 
This deficiency became clear in the im-
mediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks�
The 1980s and ’90s were a period of 
steady growth in terms of structure, 
budget, and formalized relationships 
throughout the interagency world� JSOC 
was required to be ready to launch a 
task force within four hours for a variety 
of missions of national importance� 
Although specific mission require-
ments ultimately would dictate the task 
force’s composition, significant mission 
“enablers” from inside the Defense De-
partment and external to it always had 
to be on standby� It required dedication 
of a dozen Air Force transport aircraft 
to deploy the JSOC staff, operators, 
helicopters, ground-assault vehicles, 
and other necessary equipment for 
initial operations� This initial package 
often would encompass five hundred 
people, and more people and equipment 
frequently would follow� Addition-
ally, being ready for every contingency 
required JSOC to have a comprehen-
sive liaison network throughout many 
government agencies, especially the 
Intelligence Community� This formulaic 
approach to every mission resulted in 
a large task force being deployed for 
almost every problem� As a result, JSOC 
unintentionally undermined its ability to 
deploy clandestinely and remain agile�
During this time frame, JSOC deployed 
to war alongside conventional forces in 
Panama and during Operation DESERT 
STORM� It also deployed in response 
to the hijacking of the Italian cruise 
ship Achille Lauro, which had eighteen 
Americans aboard, and to Somalia in 
1993 in what would become the “Black 
Hawk Down” debacle� Other, less-
known operations took place as well� 
The results of JSOC’s work before 9/11 
were mixed, at best� While the qual-
ity of operators in JSOC’s subordinate 
units was superb, the JSOC command 
and staff—and “Washington”—often 
underperformed� Some of these defi-
ciencies would be addressed after 9/11�
The 9/11 attacks produced a sense of 
vulnerability for Americans� They also 
created a need to respond quickly with 
force against those directly and indi-
rectly responsible� No one was more 
frustrated by the military’s inability to 
strike back quickly than Donald Rums-
feld, the Secretary of Defense� Rumsfeld 
looked to General Charles Holland, 
commander of the U�S� Special Opera-
tions Command (USSOCOM), for a 
plan� He was bitterly disappointed: Hol-
land was unprepared, and therefore was 
reluctant to seize the opportunity to take 
the war to America’s enemies� However, 
JSOC’s reputation, built in part by its 
extensive liaison network in Washington 
and its sophisticated exercise program, 
now grabbed Rumsfeld’s attention� JSOC 
easily was able to sell its unique capabili-
ties to an anxious buyer� JSOC’s bound-
less self-confidence would lead to an 
expanded role, because the administra-
tion in Washington desperately needed 
to go after Al Qaeda and its supporters�
Although JSOC was a subordinate com-
mand of USSOCOM, General Holland 
was happy to stay on the sidelines� JSOC 
would become “almost an independent 
military force for Rumsfeld,” under 
the command of Major General Dell 
Dailey� Everything seemed to be in place 
for JSOC to destroy those responsible 
for the 9/11 attacks� The leadership in 
Washington empowered JSOC to do 
whatever was necessary� The superbly 
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trained operators were anxious to make 
Bin Laden and his lieutenants pay with 
their lives for their actions� But, for the 
second time, a leadership deficiency on 
the part of a senior commander ham-
pered JSOC� General Holland, and now 
Major General Dailey, both aviators, did 
not have what was necessary to unleash 
JSOC’s special operations capabilities� 
Both were conservative, conventional 
thinkers unable to adapt to a new type of 
warfare� The triad necessary for success-
ful action had two elements in hand—
Washington sponsorship and competent 
operators—but still lacked a key ele-
ment: a proper JSOC commander� Major 
General Stanley McChrystal would fix 
this shortcoming, and with gusto�
McChrystal commanded JSOC for 
almost five years, transforming it into 
a killing machine in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and beyond� To McChrystal and many 
in Washington, JSOC was the “nation’s 
main effort in the war on terror�” He was 
in charge of a global enterprise, but the 
enterprise needed better intelligence and 
a better scheme to respond rapidly to 
that intelligence� JSOC would expand its 
liaison network within the Intelligence 
Community and to other organizations 
operating in the region� Capturing and 
interrogating enemy operatives now 
would be preferred to killing them� 
JSOC began running agent networks as 
well as putting its own operators on the 
ground, even in places such as Bengha-
zi, to develop situational awareness� 
JSOC also demanded extensive aerial 
reconnaissance assets� Likewise, war in 
the information age pushed JSOC to 
develop a cyber capability to hack into 
social media and cell phone commu-
nications� Then JSOC’s subordinate 
units needed to retool to respond to the 
growing clarity about the disposition 
of the enemy networks that the intel-
ligence process was producing�
General McChrystal’s force of person-
ality fused all these disparate parts of 
the enormous intelligence apparatus 
together� Retooling Delta Force, the 
Rangers, and SEAL Team 6 was rela-
tively easy; the troops instinctively knew 
they needed to operate in small teams 
and in unorthodox ways to defeat enemy 
networks� They welcomed McChrys-
tal’s aggressiveness and willingness to 
take risks� The war was an obsession 
for the JSOC commander� It became 
McChrystal’s life, and he wanted his 
men to understand that the war, and 
nothing else, should be their life too� His 
single-minded determination was infec-
tious to some and repellent to others� 
The JSOC commander had perfected a 
process that became known as F3EAD 
(“Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, 
Disseminate”), and the JSOC opera-
tions center was called the “Death Star�” 
“Strike to develop” intelligence became 
the task force catchphrase� McChrystal 
had perfected the F3EAD machine, and 
the process had become self-sustaining�
Naylor claims that in the U�S� military’s 
darkest days in Iraq, JSOC was the only 
American force achieving success� This 
depends on how you measure success, 
especially in light of the contemporary 
situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan� 
Under McChrystal’s leadership, JSOC’s 
operators efficiently and effectively 
found, fixed, and captured or killed 
high- and midvalue targets and anyone 
else they deemed appropriate� Often 
they fought their war disconnected 
from other U�S� and coalition forces 
that were fighting the same war� JSOC’s 
size, an issue in the 1980s and 1990s, 
grew from about eight hundred to 
more than 2,300 in 2008, not including 
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a six-hundred-man JSOC intelligence 
brigade added in late 2008� JSOC de-
manded and received a disproportionate 
share of assets, including taking control 
of other military units not only when 
necessary but when convenient—to the 
dismay of commanders also charged 
with fighting the war� But JSOC did 
kill Zarqawi and Bin Laden and many, 
many other very bad people� Leaders in 
Washington declared, “JSOC is awe-
some�” Our enemies needed killing, and 
no military unit did it better than JSOC�
Naylor tells us that before 9/11 several 
key figures described JSOC as “a Fer-
rari in the garage�” General McChrys-
tal, with the full support of leaders in 
Washington, took the Ferrari out of the 
garage and created a killing machine 
whose performance was unparalleled� 
Unfortunately, a discerning reader 
easily could conclude that the Fer-
rari actually was still on the same road 
as the rest of the U�S� military—and 
that road would lead to nowhere�
HY S� ROTHSTEIN
Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, by P� 
W� Singer and August Cole� New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2015� 416 pages� $28 (paperback $14�95,
Kindle $9�99)�
No author today will argue with Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge’s perspective that any 
work of fiction requires the reader 
to engage in a willing suspension of 
disbelief� The wording of the concept 
is important because it goes beyond 
the idea of a reader just pushing the “I 
believe” button� The concept requires 
the reader to be an active participant: 
he or she must willingly enter a world 
known to be false� It is the job of the 
author to maintain that world, to hold 
the reader suspended throughout the 
entire book, and to prevent him or 
her from falling out of the fictional 
world with an ungraceful “whump�”
For the author of a techno-thriller, 
holding the reader suspended in this 
alternate reality requires even more 
finesse than for other types of fic-
tion� The world of a techno-thriller is 
relatively close to the world in which the 
reader lives� Both the technology and 
the environment of the story are set in a 
future near enough that all the govern-
mental and organizational structures, 
global and domestic relationships, and 
technical capabilities showcased in the 
story must be close enough to what the 
reader knows today to be believable�
This is the challenge P� W� Singer and 
August Cole set for themselves in Ghost 
Fleet� It is a herculean task� The inter-
national backdrop today is far different 
from that of the techno-thriller heyday 
of the 1980s and early 1990s� The U�S� 
cultural setting of Red Storm Rising, 
published in 1986, was influenced by 
forty years of the Cold War� Dominated 
by baby boomers and gen Xers, the 
general population of the United States 
during that time had limited access to 
international news and perspectives, 
had grown up with the threat of nuclear 
war, and had been indoctrinated with 
the ideological vilification of Com-
munism� Today the cultural backdrop 
for the U�S� population is as mixed 
and varied as the people themselves� 
International news and perspectives are 
available to anyone, quite literally at the 
touch of a finger; the threat of nuclear 
war has been replaced with a threat of 
terrorism; and ideological vilification 
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revolves around extremist religious 
groups rather than nation-states�
This techno-thriller, then, with its 
hegemonic China overtaking the United 
States, feels slightly unbalanced, as if it 
is not settled on a firm foundation� It 
was only during the last decade that a 
majority of Americans came to consider 
China a player on the international 
stage, and those Americans who view 
China as a threat (with the exception of 
the U�S� Navy, perhaps) represent both 
a smaller percentage and an even newer 
phenomenon� In fact, the American 
perspective of our relationship with 
China over the past ten years probably 
can be described best as bipolar, or 
maybe schizophrenic; but historically 
China has not been considered existen-
tially threatening, and still is not com-
monly considered so today� Whump�
That means the story Pete Singer and 
August Cole create has to be strong 
enough to overcome each cultural 
inconsistency that unceremoniously 
dumps us out of our suspended disbelief� 
Unfortunately, the one-dimensional and 
stereotyped portrayal of the military 
family in the story is representative of 
the rest of the characters in the book� 
Whump� China’s “Directorate” is a 
calculating, unfeeling behemoth� The 
Russian character is a vodka-swilling 
spy� The insurgent is a femme fatale� 
Whump, whump, whump� It may be 
an editor’s dream to have characters do 
exactly what we presume they would 
do, but as a story line it does not carry 
enough of a thrill to make the reader 
want to stay engaged� Rather than 
incorporating strong, motivating factors 
(including irrational ones) that would 
make erratic actions plausible and add 
interest and depth to the story, the 
characters act exactly as their stereo-
types suggest they should—and the 
results of their actions are predictable�
The strongest element of the book is 
the technologies the authors choose to 
include� While the overuse of nomen-
clature feels clunky for all but those 
who collect technical classifications 
like Boy Scout badges, the authors do 
not reach too far into the realm of sci-
ence fiction to build their arsenal of 
weapons, chemicals, and drugs� There 
is enough linkage to existing technolo-
gies and medical trends to make the 
future employment of these more-
advanced programs feel realistic� Even 
so, they all fit into a too-predictable, 
no-surprise-here mold� There are even 
a few moments when the story feels like 
a propaganda piece for the Navy’s exist-
ing Zumwalt-class destroyer or railgun 
programs� Whump, and whump again�
All of which raises the question, who is 
the audience P� W� Singer and August 
Cole are trying to reach? If it is the 
military, we do not need to read four 
hundred pages to tell us what we already 
know� China’s versions of the concepts of 
antiaccess/area-denial and air-sea battle 
have brought plenty of visibility to the 
future risk China represents, even for 
those who have not been watching the 
Pacific for years� If the book is intended 
for a civilian population that no longer 
shares the common cultural backdrop 
that existed during the Cold War, it 
feels like just another fearmongering 
piece written by another advocate for a 
bigger defense budget� If it is a plea for 
the administration to sit up and take 
notice of China as a threat, it does not 
do a good enough job of explaining why 
all the elements of U�S� national power 
supposedly are completely defunct�
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Perhaps all of this is what makes the 
book unique, though� While the plot fol-
lows the typical path of a techno-thriller, 
where an aggressive move by a “bad guy” 
forces a “good guy” to join in a fight of 
epic proportions, the discomfort the 
reader feels at the end is real, despite 
all the fully anticipated and stereotyped 
characters, plots, and technologies�
But that is not so much thrilling as it is 
troubling� The disturbing question that 
lurks in the background and perme-
ates the plot like an insidious, deadly 
gas is, how effective is the United States 
when it comes to using the diplomatic 
and informational elements of national 
power in the international arena? This 
might have been the true heart of the 
story� Surrounded by layers of protective 
muscle in military might and economic 
strength, have the diplomatic and in-
formational elements of U�S� national 
power aged and atrophied beyond the 
size of the body they inhabit? Without 
the diplomatic and informational ele-
ments, can the government still oper-
ate on just the military and economic 
elements? The idea is unexplored, but 
Ghost Fleet, with a plot that takes Lady 
Liberty’s sword and purse away right 
from the start, leaves readers suspended 
in a disbelief completely different from 
the one they thought they were entering�
CONNIE FRIZZELL
In All Respects Ready: Australia’s Navy in World 
War One, by David Stevens� Melbourne, Austral�: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2014� 320 pages� $59�95�
Writing a definitive history of any major 
conflict from a single nation’s perspec-
tive can be an exacting task—and, in 
the case of the First World War at sea, a 
thankless one too, when compared with 
the far better known and better reported 
situation on land� This notwithstanding, 
it is hard to imagine a more timely and 
well-balanced book� David Stevens, as 
the Royal Australian Navy’s historian, 
was perhaps in a perfect position to take 
on this project, but this should in no 
way diminish what he has achieved� His 
extensive and far-reaching research has 
produced a work that, while entertain-
ing and readable, has sufficient gravitas 
to ensure it will become the defini-
tive work on the subject� This title will 
appeal to all audiences; historians will 
revel in the wealth of archival material 
and private diaries, but this book is far 
more appealing than a mere record of 
historical fact� Anyone who has been to 
sea and experienced life on board ship, 
in particular a warship, will appreciate 
the insights from someone so obviously 
well versed in this area� Drawing heav-
ily on his own seagoing background, 
Stevens presents an engaging narrative 
that gets to the very heart of the unique 
human experience that is life at sea�
In many ways, then, this book represents 
the best of both possible approaches 
to a history of this type: the broad and 
analytical, which sweeps over the major 
maritime events of the time, giving 
the work its much-needed context; 
and the intensely personal, employ-
ing many passages from diaries, letters, 
and reports that together illustrate the 
rich variety of naval life from the deck 
plates to the wardroom� To this end, 
each chapter ends with a short biog-
raphy of an important or interesting 
figure from the preceding pages, which 
both enriches and helps to consolidate 
this comprehensive coverage� The book 
also triumphs in another aspect: by not 
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overlooking the very real administra-
tive challenges the young navy faced in 
trying to establish itself simultaneously 
with the moment of its supreme test: a 
world war at sea� Thus, interspersed with 
coverage of all the important actions at 
sea is a discussion of the myriad sup-
porting activities necessary to develop 
a navy with global reach: the establish-
ment of bases and supply lines; the use 
of native labor; the issues of pay and 
benefits; the challenges of recruiting and 
training; right down to health concerns 
and the treatment of offenders and  
deserters—it is all there� Even the bore-
dom of the long and often fruitless pa-
trols in search of contraband and intel-
ligence, so much a feature of the war at 
sea and yet rarely reported on, is repro-
duced faithfully in an engaging manner�
In the end, one is left to marvel at the 
foresight of those who, all those years 
ago, came up with the “fleet unit” idea, 
as a way for the British dominions to 
contribute to the naval defense of the 
global economic system—something 
that should still resonate today, in this 
new era of naval cooperation� Australia 
alone among them persevered with it, 
and as a result was propelled within a 
few short years into the companionship 
of those nations with true global reach at 
sea� This is an important book because, 
above all else, it is a lasting testament 
to the character of the Australian sailor� 
The hurdles were enormous, but the 
Australians, it seems, always rose to the 
challenges, overcoming them with ease 
under the most trying of circumstances 
—and with an alacrity and charm 
that has endeared them to all�
ANGUS ROSS
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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